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A scientific study of consciousness should take into consideration both objective and
subjective measures of conscious experiences. To this date, very few studies have tried to
integrate third-person data, or data about the neurophysiological correlates of conscious
states, with first-person data, or data about subjective experience. Inspired by Morel’s
invention (Casares, 1940), a literary machine capable of reproducing sensory-dependent
external reality, this article suggests that combination of virtual reality techniques and brain
reading technologies, that is, decoding of conscious states by brain activity alone, can
offer this integration. It is also proposed that the multimodal, simulating, and integrative
capacities of the dreaming brain render it an “endogenous” Morel’s machine, which can
potentially be used in studying consciousness, but not always in a reliable way. Both the
literary machine and dreaming could contribute to a better understanding of conscious
states.
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INTRODUCTION
THE SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
Conscious states are inner states and processes of awareness,
with undeniable neurobiological underpinnings (Searle, 2000).
These states are by definition subjective; every scientific investi-
gation of consciousness should deal with this subjectivity (Searle,
2000; Chalmers, 2004). In addition, most theories of conscious-
ness assert that all conscious experiences have specific qualitative
attributes that differentiate them from each other (qualitative-
ness), and a unified nature (unity), which cannot be reduced to
independent components (Tononi, 2008).
It has been proposed that a science of consciousness should
systematically integrate third-person data, or data about the neu-
rophysiological correlates of conscious states, with first-person
data, or data about the distinctive qualities of subjective experi-
ence (Chalmers, 2004). Indeed, neurophysiology alone is not suf-
ficient to describe a conscious state without taking into account
the first-person’s point of view, and vice versa. Very few studies
have tried to integrate both kinds of data together (Lutz et al.,
2002; Dehaene et al., 2003). Moreover, while great progress has
been done regarding ourmethods for gathering third-person data
(e.g., neuroimaging methods or single-cell recording with elec-
trode implantation), to this date there is no sufficient scientific
description of subjective conscious experience, apart from ver-
bal report. However, verbal report represents for the scientist
only an indirect observation of a person’s subjective experiences
and is prone to certain limitations: language may misdescribe
or may be unable to describe a subjective experience or the
Abbreviations: BOLD, Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent; DR, Diminished
Reality; EEG, Electroencephalography; fMRI, functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging; HMD, Head-Mounted Display; MVPA, Multivariate Pattern Analysis;
PTO, Parieto-Temporo-Occipital; REM sleep, Rapid Eye Movement sleep; SR;
Substitutional Reality; VM/MR, Virtual and Mixed Reality.
person may voluntarily hide or lie about his/her experience
(Hospers, 1997, p. 93).
Therefore, the relatively new science of subjective conscious-
ness is in urgent need of novel methods for gathering first-person
data and, in parallel, of ways to integrate this data with their
neurophysiological correlates. Here, we will see that such an inte-
grative model of consciousness may find its inspiration from an
unlikely source: literature.
MOREL’S INVENTION AS INSPIRATION FOR AN INTEGRATIVE
DESCRIPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Adolfo Bioy Casares (1914–1999) was an Argentinian author, who
was born and lived in Buenos Aires. He is most famous for his
early fantasy novel “The Invention of Morel,” which was first pub-
lished in 1940 (Figure 1) and which blends elements of science
fiction, romance, and philosophy. Most of the story describes a
criminal’s thoughts, fears, reactions, and puzzlement over dis-
covering the inhabitants of an isolated island of the Pacific, on
which he arrives as a fugitive. During the day, these persons act in
a stereotyped manner, repeating the same behaviors and having
the same discussions. During the night, they seem to disappear
from the island. The protagonist, who is constantly afraid they
will discover him and turn him in to the authorities, decides to
approach a woman (Faustine), to whom he feels attracted. It turns
out that this woman, as well as other inhabitants, totally ignore
his presence. Other strange observations include the presence of
two suns in the sky and the discovery of identical copies of dead
fish he found on his day of arrival. Slowly he starts to question
himself as to whether his perception is reliable and if he actu-
ally dreams or hallucinates (Casares, 1940, p. 44, 52). While the
readers of this novel may also come up with all sort of theo-
ries about what is happening on the island, we finally find out
the truth: Morel, who is the scientist on this island, invented a
machine, which could capture and store “waves” and “vibrations”
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FIGURE 1 | The first Spanish edition of “The Invention of Morel”,
depicting the map of the island where the scientist Morel would have
created and used his innovating machine. Copyright: Editorial Losada
S. A., Buenos Aires, 1940, Cover by: Norah Borges.
of all human senses (visual, auditory, olfactory, somatosensory,
and gustatory). Images and frames of a human being could also be
captured, recorded, and projected by motion picture and mirror
technology (in the absence of relevant scientific evidence, Casares
gives little rational explanation for a technique which would be
later referred to as holography). When the sensory waves were
synchronized with the images projected in space, the person and
his surroundings in their totality were reproduced exactly as they
were in their initial form. These projections had weight, depth,
height, and appeared as real persons, engaging all five senses. The
machine projected on to the whole island motion images, which
had been recorded during the period of 1 week, and did this in a
loopingmode that would last forever. Thus, the protagonist learns
that he is surrounded by reproduced three-dimensional images of
persons who existed only in the past. After a short period of repul-
sion about this “fake reality,” the protagonist accepts its existence
as something better than his own. The novel ends when the fugi-
tive learns how to operate the machine and inserts himself into
the recording so it looks as if he and Faustine are in love.
In “The Invention of Morel,” Casares examines the
fundamental philosophical problems of perception and
consciousness. Influenced by George Berkeley’s subjective
idealism (Berkeley, 1713), a doctrine that supports the theory
that only mind and mental experiences exist and that physical
objects do not exist except as perceptual phenomena, the author
questions whether reality is an exclusive creation of the mind
and if human is able to perceive the world accurately through his
senses. According to Casares, human perception will always be
subjective; he symbolically represents this claim with a machine,
which reproduced perceptual reality and modulated the subject’s
(fugitive) perceptual experience, emotions, and thoughts. For
Morel, the ultimate use of his machine would be the “eternity of
consciousness”: by repeating consecutively the moments of 1 day
or 1 week, “we are powerless to escape from the consciousness we
had in each one of those moments and we shall have no memories
other than those we had in the corresponding moment of the eternal
record. The future, left behind many times, will thus maintain its
attributes forever” (Casares, 1940, p. 76).
The scientist considered that “we have no valid reason to deny
consciousness to the persons created by his machinery” (Casares,
1940, p. 71). The protagonist of “Invention of Morel,” becom-
ing aware of the forces that this machine can have, proposes
that it should be enhanced with the capacity to describe the
thoughts, emotions, and other brain states of a subject any
distance away from him/her (Casares, 1940, p. 82). This enhanced
machine would offer the ability to describe consciousness, as
“one’s thoughts and feelings during life will be like an alphabet
with which the image will continue to comprehend all experience”
(Casares, 1940, p. 82). Although Morel’s machine was not such a
brain reading machine, and Casares’ idea may have seemed naive
and totally fictive until some years ago, astonishing progress in
several facets of cognitive neuroscience, functional neuroimag-
ing, and computational neuroscience, now permit us to wonder if
decoding perceptual reality and mental states from brain activity
is possible.
So, according to Casares’ novel, a “consciousness device”
should satisfy two simultaneous conditions:
1. Multimodal perception binding [“when all senses are synchro-
nized, the soul emerges” (Casares, 1940, p. 71)]. This condition
is in accordance with many philosophers and neuroscien-
tists, who consider that consciousness is characterized by
the apparent unity of perceptual experience despite multi-
ple sense modalities (Llinas et al., 1998; Searle, 2000; Llinas,
2008). We will here see that virtual reality technologies can
enhance or alter aspects of unity and subjectivity (e.g., self-
processing, bodily self-consciousness) and thus inform us
about these aspects of consciousness (Blanke, 2012; Tajadura-
Jimenez et al., 2012).
2. Brain reading of qualitative conscious experiences. Brain read-
ing is now considered as a very promising novel approach
to the study of specific conscious states (Weil and Rees,
2010). Apart from its utility in non-communicating sub-
jects (e.g., locked-in patients), this method may be also
capable of offering a more objective measure of con-
scious states than traditional fMRI or behavioral meth-
ods, by bypassing biases of the subject-examiner interaction
(e.g., suggestibility).
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The departure point of this article is to draw analogies between a
literary device (Morel’s invention) and current progress in virtual
reality (chapter “Reinventing Morel’s Machine I: Virtual Reality
Component”) and brain reading (chapter “Reinventing Morel’s
Machine II: Brain Reading Component”). These technologies
will be described briefly, and will be proposed as necessary
and complementary tools to simultaneously gather first-person
(virtual reality) and third-person (brain reading) data (chap-
ter “Combining Virtual Reality and Brain Reading Technologies
in Order to Describe Consciousness”). Bioy Casares proposes
such an integrated model of consciousness, even if only in
the form of philosophical idea and not of scientific expertise.
Later in the article, we will wonder if the multimodal, sim-
ulating, and integrative capacities of the dreaming brain can
reliably inform us about consciousness (chapter “The Dreaming
Brain as an ‘Endogenous’ Morel’s Machine and its Relation to
Consciousness”). Both the literary and dreaming machines, and
their integrative characteristics, could inspire cognitive scientists
to create new experiments and similar combined (virtual reality/
decoding) devices.
REINVENTING MOREL’S MACHINE I: VIRTUAL REALITY
COMPONENT
Although Morel’s invention lacks scientific value per se, the idea
was innovating. Current virtual reality technologies can create,
modulate, and alter perceptual and physical reality, similarly to
Morel’s machine (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Suzuki et al., 2012).
Substitutional reality (SR) refers to reproducing, modulating,
or substituting live reality without noticing the change. This
is possible with the aid of virtual and mixed reality techniques
(VR/MR), like a head-mounted display (HMD), a control
computer, and a panoramic video camera (SR system) (Suzuki
et al., 2012). The SR system can ensure natural visuo-motor
coupling of real-time scenes and previously recorded scenes, so
that participants wearing the HMD can experience both kind of
scenes within a continuum, without noticing a reality gap. These
experiences can be inconsistent, like for example encountering
themselves (Doppelgänger scene). They can even experience
identical episodes repeatedly (e.g., conversations, movements) in
an eternal déjà-vu situation. Very interestingly, these experiences
share an astonishing resemblance to Casares’ world. Pre-recorded
scenes by a panoramic camera have been used in both SR system
and Morel’s machine, making Casares’ novel both prophetic
and scientifically innovative, considering the year of its first
publication (1940). Other methods used for SR are mixed reality
(MR) system (Costanza et al., 2009) and diminished reality (DR)
system (Herling and Broll, 2010), which allow interactions of a
person with a fictive environment, using more than one sense
in an integrative way. Other scientists, using virtual reality and
multisensory conflict, succeeded in creating an illusion where
healthy participants experienced a virtual body (avatar) as if it
were their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Furthermore, the
participants said that the sensorimotor experiences of the avatars
felt like their own. Importantly, most of the subjects using the
aforementioned virtual technologies do not doubt their false
perception (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Slater, 2009; Suzuki et al.,
2012), a reaction similar to the dreaming state (chapter “The
Dreaming Brain as an ‘Endogenous’ Morel’s Machine and its
Relation to Consciousness”).
According to Damasio “consciousness occurs when we can gener-
ate, automatically, the sense that a given stimulus is being perceived
in a personal perspective; the sense that the stimulus is ‘owned’ by
the organism involved in the perceiving; and, last but not least, the
sense that the organism can act on the stimulus (or fail to do so)”
(Damasio, 1998). These criteria can be fulfilled in a virtual envi-
ronment (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005), where many aspects
of subjective states (self-identification, interoceptive sensitivity,
bodily, and emotional experiences) and self-perception (multi-
sensory binding) can be controlled experimentally. More specifi-
cally, bymanipulating several parameters, such as graphics frame-
rate, sound, haptics, virtual body representation, and movement,
we can modulate the qualitative and subjective attributes of a
virtual experience. Inside such an environment, enhanced verbal
reports (Witmer and Singer, 1998), or behavioral measures, such
as the postural sway (Freeman et al., 2000) and the resolution of
conflicting multi-sensory cues (Maravita et al., 2003), or physio-
logical measures, such as the autonomic bodily responses (e.g.,
heart rate, skin conductance), can be used to measure subjec-
tive experiences (Insko, 2003). Therefore, and in accordance with
others (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jimenez et al., 2012), I propose that virtual reality technologies or
similar techniques (e.g., mirrors, illusions) can be useful in the
description of first-person data. Their use may bring us a step
closer to studying the question of qualia, that is, our subjective,
conscious experience of things, which has specific properties and
neural underpinnings (Llinas, 2002), and which has been largely
neglected by experimental studies. As Antti Revonsuo stated, “The
virtual reality-community has done a valuable service to conscious-
ness research, because what they have come up with are terms that
capture the realization of subjective phenomenal organization from
the first-person’s point of view” (Revonsuo, 1999, p. 92).
REINVENTINGMOREL’S MACHINE II: BRAIN READING
COMPONENT
By modulating subjective experiences, virtual reality can offer
promising scientific investigation of the ontological subjectivity.
However, an objective measure of this experience will be only
possible by studying its neurophysiological correlates. This can
be accurately achieved by brain reading. Brain reading refers
to the decoding of perceptual or mental conscious states by
brain activity alone. The modern methods of “brain reading”
are essentially two: invasive techniques, which include electrode
implantation in the brain (Kennedy and Bakay, 1998), and non-
invasive techniques, which refer to conventional and multivariate
neuroimaging approaches (Haynes and Rees, 2006). They per-
mit decoding of mental states with high accuracy and reasonable
temporal resolution. Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) is the
most common technique used in brain reading studies (Weil and
Rees, 2010).
In this article I will only briefly describe the most recent and
important findings on brain reading of conscious states, as a more
exhaustive analysis is not the objective of this article, and it has
been already done elsewhere (Haynes and Rees, 2006; Tong and
Pratte, 2012).
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DECODING PERCEPTUAL REALITY FROM BRAIN ACTIVITY
Morel’s visual “waves and vibrations” would correspond to visual
experiences reconstructed from brain activity (BOLD signals or
EEG). Such a reconstruction was recently described by several
groups (Kamitani and Tong, 2006; Kay et al., 2008; Miyawaki
et al., 2008; Nishimoto et al., 2011). Tellingly, Miyawaki et al.
reconstructed visual images from fMRI signals of the human
visual cortex on a single trial basis. A large variety of images
(2100 possible images) were accurately reconstructed without any
prior information about the image. On the other hand, the
Gallant group (Naselaris et al., 2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011) pre-
sented a motion-energy model of visual reconstruction. They
described a Bayesian decoder using fMRI signals from early and
anterior visual areas in order to reconstruct complex natural
images. They extended this decoder so that it could model brain
activity elicited by dynamic stimuli such as natural movies in
the occipitotemporal visual cortex of human subjects (Figure 2).
Based on these models, future studies could further improve
reconstructed image quality by increasing the number of video
FIGURE 2 | On the left: visual experience from natural movies. On the
right: reconstruction of these images by decoding brain activity. Adapted
from movie S1 published in Current Biology, 21, Nishimoto, S., Vu, A. T.,
Naselaris, T., Benjamini, Y., Yu, B., and Gallant, J. L. “Reconstructing visual
experiences from brain activity evoked by natural movies.” Supplementary
Information. Copyright: Elsevier 2011. Figure approved by corresponding
author Jack Gallant.
images shown during the encoding and by integrating new knowl-
edge about the neural representation of visual images.
Reconstructing auditory attributes, like hearing spoken
language was also described (Formisano et al., 2008; Raizada
et al., 2010; Abrams et al., 2011). Most recently, Pasley et al.
(2012) used intracranial recordings from the auditory cortex of
patients while they listened to a sequence of different words. By
recording the neural responses from the superior temporal gyrus
using spectrogram and modulation-based auditory representa-
tions, they succeeded in accurately reconstructing syllable rate,
syllable onsets, and offsets, and individual words, directly from
brain activity.
Patterns of activity in the human posterior piriform cortex
were found to predict accurately the perceptual ratings of odor
quality (Howard et al., 2009). In the future, similar (pattern-
based) techniques could be used to predict distinct olfactive
experiences by recording odor-evoked response potentials from
olfactory receptor neurons in response to distinct olfactory stim-
uli with an electro-olfactogram (Lapid and Hummel, 2013).
DECODING AND PREDICTING MENTAL STATES FROM BRAIN ACTIVITY
Decoding mental imagery and memory
An important question that confronts current research in neu-
roscience is whether we can predict mental states, like emotions,
memories, and thoughts based on the measurement of brain
activity alone (a question that the protagonist of “The Invention
of Morel” also had). Indeed, individual introspective mental
events, like imagination of a face or a house, can be tracked from
brain activity in highly specialized regions of the ventral visual
pathway, like the fusiform face area or the parahippocampal place
area (O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). Decoding of object rep-
resentation (e.g., chairs, shoes, animals) from response patterns
in object-selective regions of the temporal lobe is also possible
due to pattern-based analysis or support vector machines (Haxby
et al., 2001; Cox and Savoy, 2003). The orientation, direction of
motion, and perceived color of a visual stimulus can also be pre-
dicted by decoding patterns of signals from the early visual cortex
(Kamitani and Tong, 2005).
Recently, decoding long-term episodic memories while they
are being recalled by the participants was also achieved. After
training pattern classifiers to discriminate between certain cate-
gories (famous places, persons, or common objects), that were
shown to participants under fMRI, a correct prediction of cate-
gory was achieved upon subsequent retrievals (Polyn et al., 2005).
A similar prediction of other complex episodic memories (e.g.,
movie recall or spatial memories) was also achieved by activity
in the hippocampus (Chadwick et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2011).
Other fMRI studies decoded semantic memory (Naselaris et al.,
2009) or predicted brain responses to novel nouns associated with
verbs of known semantic attributes (e.g., see, hear, eat, or touch)
(Mitchell et al., 2008).
Predicting emotional states and decision choices
Emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear, and anger activate
networks of several cortical and subcortical brain regions such
as insula, amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, medial and lateral
prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate
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cortex (Phan et al., 2002). Could we accurately predict these
emotional states only from brain activity (fMRI signals)? Strong
responses in an extended limbic circuit (amygdala, insula, trans-
verse temporal gyrus, temporal operculum, planum tempo-
rale, and inferior frontal gyrus) after an emotional stimulus
(mother’s voice) were found in the Minimally Conscious State
(Bekinschtein et al., 2004). More recently, an online support vec-
tor machine was able to reliably predict and decode three discrete
emotional states (happiness, disgust, and sadness) from brain
activity while individuals performed emotion imagery (Sitaram
et al., 2011). Involvement of the frontal cortex, anterior cingu-
late cortex, and insula in emotion imagery was also revealed.
In another study, resting brain metabolism in the amygdala, the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex predicted responses during fear extinction and extinction
recall (Linnman et al., 2012). Future experiments should address
predictability of other emotional states too, as well as construc-
tion of subject-independent brain state classifiers, as the afore-
mentioned studies require collection of initial data for classifier
training.
Similarly, using classifier learning from a simple reward-
based decision-making task and a multivariate analysis approach,
an accurate prediction of subsequent behavioral choices was
achieved (Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007). Activation of three
regions of interest out of nine (anterior cingulate cortex, medial
prefrontal cortex, and ventral striatum) was sufficient for the
prediction. A similar study design for purchasing decisions
has shown that activity of the nucleus accumbens and medial
prefrontal cortex can correctly predict subsequent purchases
(Knutson et al., 2007).
COMBINING VIRTUAL REALITY AND BRAIN READING
TECHNOLOGIES IN ORDER TO DESCRIBE CONSCIOUS
STATES
Bringing to mind Casares hypothesis, I propose here that virtual
reality and brain reading can inform us conjointly about con-
sciousness. Virtual reality will provide scientists with the ability to
experimentally examine the component of subjectivity and unity
of a subject’s conscious state, whereas brain reading will provide
us with the objective measure of the same state.
Theoretically, an on-line decoding “consciousness device,”
could consist of a virtual environment system, easy to use for daily
operation, such as the SR system [as described in Suzuki et al.
(2012)] combined with an fMRI decoder, according to what con-
scious state we want to examine (e.g., visual experiences, mental
imagery, emotional experience). By means of the SR system, the
examiner could induce specific and targeted subjective conscious
states in the subject and use the measures of subjective experience
exposed previously (enhanced verbal report, behavioral, physio-
logical measures) (see chapter “Reinventing Morel’s Machine I:
Virtual Reality Component”); the fMRI decoder could then pro-
vide an objective measure of this conscious state. Importantly,
the subject can be informed about the objective measure of
his/her experience (brain processes), what could further improve
the reliability of his/her verbal reports (metacognitive proper-
ties). Future experiments could be based on this model, although
improvement in temporal and spatial resolution of current neu-
roimaging techniques is certainly needed.
It should also be noted that, to this date, decoding infor-
mation from several simultaneously occurring modalities (e.g.,
vision and attention, audition and memory) is not possible,
as current methodologies cannot overcome the potential spatial
and neurobiological superposition of these states. Therefore,
improvement of statistical pattern recognition algorithms is
required.
THE DREAMING BRAIN AS AN “ENDOGENOUS” MOREL’S
MACHINE AND ITS RELATION TO CONSCIOUSNESS
Based on neuroscientific, philosophical, and artificial intelligence
models, we have until now assumed that a better description and
representation of consciousness should includemultimodal bind-
ing and flexible access to subjectivity and to qualitativeness of
conscious states. Virtual reality and brain reading could offer us
such integration. A “consciousness” device being still inapplica-
ble due to restrictions of current techniques, studying internal
states with similar multimodal perceptual integration and sim-
ulation of subjective, qualitative experiences, such as dreaming,
could further elucidate our understanding of conscious states.
The question that is then posed is: can dreaming reliably inform
us about consciousness?
DREAMING CAN INFORM US ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS
Studying dream states can potentially contribute to the inves-
tigation of some of the neurobiological, representational, and
functional aspects of self-consciousness.
At first glance, the dreaming brain could be considered as
an ideal “endogenous” Morel’s machine. It integrates successfully
(Hong et al., 2009) the sensorimotor plus cognitive and emotional
modalities described previously in the article, into a subjective
experience. The most prevalent sensory modality in dreams is
vision (100%) and audition (40–60%), while movements and tac-
tile sensations (15–30%) or smell and taste (less than 1%) are less
frequent (Strauch et al., 1996). Thalamocortical signaling during
sleep lowers the thresholds of associative areas so that they pro-
duce perceptual and cognitive experience, even in the absence
of external sensory input. More specifically, activation of the
visual association cortex and parieto-temporo-occipital (PTO)
junction appear to be responsible for visual imagery and spatial
cognition during dreaming (Braun et al., 1997; Nofzinger et al.,
2002). Activation in auditory temporal cortices and motor cir-
cuits (including the cerebellum and basal ganglia) (Braun et al.,
1997) is consistent with auditory elements and fictive motor
actions respectively. Moreover, activation of motivational, mem-
ory, and emotional circuits (Perogamvros and Schwartz, 2012)
may reflect active reward processing, memory consolidation, and
emotion regulation processes during sleep. Interestingly, memory
processing seems to initially precede and initiate visual imagery
in dreaming (Ji and Wilson, 2007), in agreement with theo-
ries proposing that sleep-dependent memory-reward processing
is responsible for dream generation (Freud, 1900; Solms, 2000;
Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Perogamvros and Schwartz, 2012).
We should note that the synchronous activity in the thalamocor-
tical system, considered as the core of consciousness (Llinas and
Ribary, 2001), is present in both wakefulness and sleep (Llinas and
Ribary, 1993). Therefore, intrinsic activity in this system during
dreaming could inform us about waking conscious states.
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Dreams also share common features with virtual reality, as
they are characterized by misinterpretation of the perceptual
input (the dreamer considers the sensory stimuli as incoming),
and by perceptual distortions, such as alterations in spatio-
temporal integration, bizarreness, and out-of-body experiences
(heautoscopy). Most of these features may relate to changes in
regional brain activity and in functional connectivity between
brain regions (Maquet et al., 2005; Massimini et al., 2010).
The ability of the brain to accept a fictional reality it creates
as an actual one (adhesion), and thus alter the state of its
own perception, is related to activations of the left ventral infe-
rior frontal gyrus and left posterior superior temporal sulcus
(Metz-Lutz et al., 2010). Interestingly enough, both regions dis-
play increased activity during sleep compared to wakefulness
(Braun et al., 1997; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2002; Kaufmann
et al., 2006). Perceptual experience in dreams, contrary to wak-
ing experience, is a genuine representation of subjective idealism
(see chapter “Morel’s Invention as Inspiration of an Integrative
Description of Consciousness”), because all sensory stimuli exist
solely as perceptual brain products. Therefore, by studying per-
ceptual and cognitive subjectivity as represented in dreams,
dream research could contribute to the theoretical understanding
of first-person data.
Finally, it has been proposed that off-line emotional mat-
uration takes place during Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep
since as early as the 13th week of gestation (Kurjak et al., 2005;
Dondi et al., 2007) and that quiet sleep of human neonates con-
tributes to the formation of cortical connections required for
sensorimotor coordination and body representation (Milh et al.,
2007). Overall, sleep seems necessary for the genesis of conscious-
ness and self-awareness via the interaction of genetic instructions
with off-line sleep-dependent perceptual experiences (Hobson,
2009; Perogamvros, 2012). In addition, dream consciousness
seems important for the development and maintenance of wak-
ing consciousness and cognition, by contributing to sensorimotor
integration, virtual reality simulation, and performance improve-
ment in an off-line mode (Revonsuo, 1995; Perogamvros and
Schwartz, 2012).
DREAMING IS NOT ALWAYS RELIABLE FOR STUDYING
CONSCIOUSNESS
Dreaming offers a unique condition of internal information pro-
cessing, which is functionally isolated from the external world.
Indeed, dream consciousness, which may arise as ascending
activation of attractor networks of visual and multimodal asso-
ciation areas, is, at least partially (Arzi et al., 2012), discon-
nected from the external environment. This is due to domination
of internally oriented cortical networks, like the brain default
network (Domhoff, 2011), over externally oriented cortical net-
works. This disconnection of the internal dreaming state from
the external environment explains why, up until now, the sole
way of studying dreams is to base the examination on subjec-
tive parameters: what the subject remembers of his/her dream
after being awakened. Consequently, decoding a dream state with
lack of objective information about the encoded state, reduces
significantly the accurate assessment of the examined state.
Indeed, reconstructing dream reality with a dream decoder
and thus being able to visualize dreaming experience remains a
staple of science fiction stories. Theoretically, internally generated
signals from the PTO junction could be reconstructed similarly
to the reproduction of external static or dynamic visual stim-
uli (as described in “Decoding Perceptual Reality from Brain
Activity”). However, considering that the dreaming experience
is multimodal, an ideal dream decoder should be based not
only on sensory decoding models (Nishimoto et al., 2011; Pasley
et al., 2012) (see section “Decoding Perceptual Reality from
Brain Activity”), but also on semantic (Schwartz, 2004; Mitchell
et al., 2008; Andrews et al., 2009), episodic (Polyn et al., 2005),
emotional (Sitaram et al., 2011), and motor (Dehaene et al.,
1998) models. Importantly, this multimodal decoder would need
sophisticated pattern-classification algorithms, due to increased
novelty in dreamed representations (Perogamvros and Schwartz,
2012). Interestingly, the image reconstructions of natural movies
of Nishimoto et al.’s decoder (Nishimoto et al., 2011) (Figure 2)
share a striking similarity to the dream images reproduced by a
visual dream decoder in the WimWenders’ film “Until the End of
the World” (1991) (Figure 3).
Apart from technical difficulties in the evaluation of decoding
accuracy of dreaming, there are several phenomenological rea-
sons for which dreaming cannot always offer a reliable description
of consciousness. These are described in the dream argument and
the functional dissociation argument.
The dream argument (Zhuàngzi, 369 BCE; Plato, 360 BCE;
Aristotle, 350 BCE; Descartes, 1641) postulates that dreaming
and waking life experiences are not easily distinguishable, because
they are both based on a potentially faulty perceptual system.
FIGURE 3 | Image reconstructions from dreams using a dream
decoder in the Wim Wenders film “Until the end of the world”
(1991). “Dog and cat,” “Woman running,” and “Paris,” Wim Wenders
1991, Electronic Paintings from “Until the end of the World” by Wim
Wenders, 1994 (Director’s Cut). Copyright: Wim Wenders Foundation,
Düsseldorf.
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This skeptical hypothesis claims that the sleeping mind is not a
reliable mechanism for attempting to differentiate reality from
illusion. What may actually separate waking from dream con-
sciousness is their different degree of coherence (waking expe-
rience> dreaming experience) and the assumption that we can
more easily explain dream content by means of waking-life expe-
riences than the reverse. However, the distinction between the
two states can only be approximate, as recent experiments are in
support of the dream argument (Mazzoni and Loftus, 1996).
The functional dissociation argument described here considers
that dream consciousness and waking consciousness may not be
functionally related. Although there is evidence that past and cur-
rent waking concerns influence dream content (Cartwright et al.,
2006), dream consciousness is largely characterized by novelty
and creativity. Indeed, while a large proportion of dream ele-
ments comes from recent memory (Schwartz, 2003), integrated
life episodes are incorporated in no more than 1–2% of dreams
reports (Fosse et al., 2003). Dreams are usually novel construc-
tions and rarely reproductions of past events (Meier, 1993). This
leads inevitably to the question: is the dreaming life determin-
istically secondary to our waking life? In other words, is sleep
the “servant” of waking life and do the activations of brain
networks during dreaming reflect a function sleep serves for wak-
ing life or for itself? Could it be that the awakened avatar in
our dreams has an independent Self and leads a “second life,”
which is independent of our wakefulness? Current neuroimag-
ing studies compare and interpret the activation/deactivation
patterns in sleep in relation to wakefulness, assuming that the
latter defines a principal state of reference. However, activated
emotional and reward networks as well as deactivated reality-
monitoring structures in sleep could define a protoconscious state
(Hobson, 2009), whose existence and roles may be completely
independent of and distinct from the waking conscious state.
This statement may be partially supported by evidence that con-
genitally blind people can have visual dreams (Lopes Da Silva,
2003). Similar findings have been demonstrated for congeni-
tally paraplegic and deaf-mute persons, who have dreams with
modalities not experienced during waking life (Voss et al., 2011).
Therefore, a possible functional dissociation between the wak-
ing Self and the dreaming Self [protoself according to Hobson
(2009)], should be addressed in future studies. As J. L. Borges
imagined in 1940 in his story “Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”
(Borges, 1944):
“while we are asleep here, we are awake somewhere else, and every
man is thus two men.”
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, a literary source (The Invention of Morel)
has been the inspiration for an integrative model of con-
sciousness. The combined binding/brain reading approach of
Casares would sufficiently describe the main attributes of con-
sciousness: unity, subjectivity, and qualitativeness (Searle, 2000).
With current technologies, this approach would correspond to
a combined virtual reality/multimodal decoder, which could
manipulate subjective conscious states (virtual reality com-
ponent) and decode them (brain reading component). This
approach could simultaneously gather first-person data with
third-person data.
The association of virtual reality technologies and decoders
seems necessary, as brain reading techniques alone offer insuffi-
cient description of consciousness. Indeed, brain reading informs
us accurately and with reasonable temporal resolution about
the neurophysiological correlates of conscious states, but not
about subjectivity. On the other hand, virtual reality technolo-
gies, already used to explore self-consciousness (Sanchez-Vives
and Slater, 2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007), offer a promis-
ing and sophisticated methodology for investigation of subjective
experience.
Although some preliminary results demonstrate that integra-
tion of first-person data and third-person data may be possible
with current methodologies (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2001; Lutz et al.,
2002; Dehaene et al., 2003), restrictions in temporal and spatial
resolution of neuroimaging techniques render studies investigat-
ing associations between subjective states and objective measures,
difficult to perform. Future experiments should address these
issues.
Faced with these difficulties, studying an internal state
incorporating multimodal integration and reality simulation,
such as dreaming, could further elucidate the nature of
conscious states. Although technical difficulties (to date,
verbal reports are the only method of studying dreams)
and questions about phenomenology (the dream argument
and the functional dissociation argument), render dream-
ing a not always reliable model for consciousness, it may
still answer some crucial questions of neurobiological, rep-
resentational, and functional aspects of self-consciousness,
such as perceptual binding, sensorimotor integration, and
self-identification.
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